NPEC War and Diplomatic Simulations

Game Format and Scenario:

Game participants were assigned to one of three teams: (1) United States, (2) People’s Republic of China, and (3) Japan and Regional Allies (Australia, RoK, Taiwan and other nations in the region). The control center observed and conducted overall game administration (the team assignments and participant’s roles are available here).

Move one began in 2027 and participants engaged in operational space capabilities that were assumed to be in an experimental phase. Each team was provided a set of capabilities with which they could conduct space situational awareness, and offensive and defensive space control operations. Commercial assets resided in all orbits by 2027-2029, and teams were able to target these assets as desired or use these assets to support military missions.

Move two replayed move one in 2029 with each team having more space operational capabilities. Finally, move three examined the long-term implications of the crisis. After move three, teams were asked two questions: What worked and what didn’t and what new initiatives and capabilities might have made a decisive difference in the game’s outcome.

At the start of move one (2027), the PRC had not put significant naval, air, or ground forces behind its enforcement of its declared Taiwan exclusive economic zone. The PRC’s goal in implementing the Taiwan exclusive economic zone was not to starve the island, but to increase China’s political jurisdiction and control over its renegade province.

In NPEC’s earlier Taiwan wargame, held in October of 2020, China attempted military enforcement of an exclusive Taiwan economic zone. This devolved into a series of air and naval battles with the United States and Japan. These battles resulted in significant casualties and loss of assets for all sides and left the long-term resolution of the conflict very much in doubt.

In this China space wargame, the PRC took a different course, it initiated space control operations in hopes of weakening U.S. resolve and separating American regional allies (e.g., Japan, RoK, Australia) from opposing China’s future economic zone enforcement effort against Taiwan. For this scenario (see space orders of battle), the PRC had ten rendezvous satellites that could serve as ASATS, and up to 17 ground-based laser systems that might be used for ASAT purposes. The 10 service satellites’ commercial raison d’etre was to rendezvous with an operational satellite to provide refueling. However, the satellites’ robotic arms also could be used to interfere with another satellite without its permission, essentially acting as an ASAT platform. In the American case, ASAT capabilities included several first-generation commercial re-fueling satellites in GEO, two commercial satellites with “space-tug” capability, and the U.S. X-37B space plane for possible LEO anti-satellite missions, and several commercial laser-track systems, (such as the EOS system in Australia) with enough power to move LEO space debris from collisions with active satellites.