

Notes Turn 2

- **Now that Taiwan resistance is a fact, what is the plan for subduing the rebellious province?**
 - Slow in US military escalation, make clear that aims are limited. All we wish to do is run naval campaign against hostile force. Keep magnifying that in the region
 - Others feel that as the PRC we want to reunite with Taiwan and Taiwanese government has fired on us. We are not going to invade Taiwan maybe there is a political method we can use to reunite with Taiwan.
 - Should we widen campaign to include political targets? DPP Government?
 - Some people feel you could use war crimes against top leadership
 - Limited, targeted strikes against Taiwanese leadership
 - Others feel that traditional military action is stronger than an attack on leadership
 - Some course of political action – other people are in agreement that PRC is planning on invasion with an increase in Naval ships
 - Make blockage absolute – no commercial ships, etc. But send in supplies that Taiwan needs and dare them to destroy the ship.
 - Propaganda videos of Taiwan government hoarding supplies. Government got us into this. Create imagery that is compelling against Taiwan government.
 - Good diplomatic situation to stay in war. Makes sense to make decision about next military move and whether to bring US in or not.
 - Ideal scenario is that US stays out and Taiwan changes government. No urgency to use amphibious force that we developed.
 - Group agrees to minimize conflict with US but taking incremental approach towards Taiwan
 - Group is fine bringing additional military force but not firing first shots
 - Group does not want to bring carrier down – do not want to risk pride of fleets
 - Collective perception – sending humanitarian mission to Taiwan with supplies, if US tries to challenge this then they are the ones creating issues
 - Put nuclear boats in central pacific and don't keep them in the port.
 - Alternative strategy – send them down to straits of Malacca will put more pressure on Korea, Japan, etc.
 - Some feel that SSBNs are not safe
 - Hanon boats to Singapore, Northern fleets to augment Eastern Fleet, SS Boats from Northern Fleets, SSBNs into South China Sea. Carrier is staying in the Yellow Sea. SSNs into Central Pacific.
 - Going for outlying islands in Taiwan – someone feels that this would not make a difference.
 - Try to play Russian card – if we want Japanese to focus North instead of South
 - Group agrees that DPRK is shooting missile over Japan, over Tokyo.
 - Japan – are we going to shoot missiles out of Cadena. Group says yes.
- If direct conflict with the U.S. occurs, what is the theory for victory?

- We are not willing to fire first shots, but if US takes on direct involvement what should we respond with? If US ship runs into blockade.
- Some feel that the US is crossing our line and we are in legitimate space to attack the ship. If we are provoked, we will act.
- Seize the opportunity to be defensive and use as an off ramp
- More friction for Washington with weapons that will directly threaten US troops in Korea. Make sure US troops throughout the region are in line of fire
 - Some don't agree with that because we want stability in the Peninsula
 - We don't want Japanese and South Koreans to think that this is directed at North Korea and we need to address Chinese threat.
- This is an internal affair and any attack on Chinese soil will be perceived as an attack
- Our biggest advantage is geographic position and biggest disadvantage is lack of allies in the region. We want to do the opposite of long march strategy and do as much as we can while we have the advantage
- Some feel there is no need to launch amphibious attack.
- May have opportunity to call America's bluff about not allowing forces to enter Taiwan. Seize initiative
- What are the conflict off ramps and how can they be achieved?
 - The off ramp is calling their bluff. Once it's obvious America will not rise the situation is de-escalated, they just need to accept the "one China"
- What is the PRC reaction to likely UK and Australian support for the U.S.?
 - Treat UK and Australia the same way as US such as sinking ships. British are being imperialist again. Give support to SMP
 - Make strong economic case against Australia
 - Australian air bases being leveraged by the US – how do we off ramp?
 - Some feel air base not a concern
 - Need to send clear message to Australian that ex-pats in China will pay consequence, up hostage diplomacy
 - The sooner this is resolved the sooner we can get back to business
- What capabilities and policies are viewed as offering the greatest leverage to achieve PRC objectives?
 - Greatest leverage is huge economy that most the world will try to avoid disengaging from. Most of Asia will not want to loose access to Chinese economy because of Taiwan.
 - Missiles are an asset

Bring Taiwan back under PRC Control – what actions are we taking

- Prevail in crisis short of war [with US]?
- If Taiwan resists, what's our plan to subdue?
- Break Taiwanese will to continue in conflict and make it hard for the US to engage
- As the US is not actively involved – do what it takes to keep the US out/ slow down any US involvement
 - Minimize risk of conflict with US by minimize shots fired, do blockade, send humanitarian support to “sooner T stops aggression the better for everyone”
- Keep reinforcing that to the US and local regional allies to stay out
- Continue the air campaign against US and leave it at that
- Cyber operations will be conducted in all aspects to include last ditch effort against the power grid in Taiwan
- Taiwan has fired on PRC so we PRC should continue to press this - because THEY have fired upon PRC, they have given PRC the opportunity of a lifetime
- Do we target political targets? Yes, but target the DPP govt militarily – stray piece of ordinance, enabling us to bolster their opposition who claims the US will never come to their aid
- Start “war crimes” charges? Possibly not, but the targeted strikes against political leadership is good, but not SOF/ amphibious/ kinetic activities
- How about PRC restrict ALL commercial vessels going to Taiwan and insert our own blockade

Bring Taiwan back under PRC Control – what actions are we taking – cont.

- Start a HUMANITARIAN mission for T against the rogue elements within T - How about INFOWAR ops with propaganda videos blaming the Taiwanese leadership for all the escalation, indict the US as the player who's escalating
- IF THE US send 3 carrier groups, are we going to engage? We'll need more vessels (400nm of China), but we don't want to get too far out into sea, or else the US may well win.
 - We would leave our carrier group just out of port but not too far to risk it – start ASW activities – only send some naval re-enforcements frigates and destroyers. Asymmetric actions could include mining the SCS and around T and all lines of access.
 - Our non-nuclear/diesel submarines should also move down – 21D – has range that goes beyond Taiwan “carrier busters” offensive capabilities
 - We can use our cruise missiles on some long range aircraft
 - PT missile boats
 - Send nuclear submarines out to Central Pacific and send out the JL2 SSBMs where we could actually reach the US homeland.
 - Carrier remains in the Yellow Sea
 - Send some subs to the Straits of Malacca from the southern fleet
- Have DPRK engage with a missile directed over Tokyo – triggering a political crisis in the US which serves our needs and we want to keep Tokyo out of the conflict
- Play the Russia card as well in the Sea of Japan, as well.
- What if US engages from Kadina, PRC shoots back

Bring Taiwan back under PRC Control – what actions are we taking

- If direct conflict with US occurs, what's our theory for victory?
- What are the conflict off-ramps and how can they be achieved?
- What level of direct American involvement are we going to use to provoke us?
 - “this is an internal Chinese affair and any interference will be handled as an attack on the Chinese nation”
 - They sailed into EEZ, we rammed them
 - They do ANYTHING, we're provoked, we act – while leaving space for ambiguity
 - If they “accidentally” ram us to we ram them, yes. Allow for gentler response as ramp-off
 - If the us escalates, we go after the US carriers
- Our biggest advantage is early in the conflict due to our geographic position – seize the moment and get as much done as possible militarily
- Once we're in conflict with US, we'll focus all of our military effort against the US naval forces until defeated or they leave, or until Taiwanese resistance is gone
- Calling US bluff, they're not ready to defend, but we are now readying
- We'll return to the status quo of a prosperous Chinese Taiwan
- Calling the US bluff IS an off-ramp
- The US just have to follow the policy of recognizing one China

How will PRC react to Japan, Australia, UK or other regional support to US forces

- We treat any ally the same as we would the imperialist Americans, which may well include sinking vessels and attacking economy, say good-bye to the FTA
- Those bases only a concern in a long war which is going badly for us
- Up our hostage diplomacy: Send CLEAR price of the cost to Australians in Hong Kong, and other locations.
- The sooner this is resolved, the sooner we're all back to prosperous business, reestablishing a peaceful world order
- Leader to leader calls to Japan/ Australia illustrating the internal nature of this conflict and extending our hand in friendship for a long-term prosperous global economy
- Call out DPRK for their errant missile
- Accept the Philippines' offer

What capabilities and policies are viewed as offering the greatest lever to achieve PRC objectives

- Our economy – mess with it, or lose access due to Taiwan
- Our missiles /our air forces /our surface ships/carriers, did I say missiles?!