

Move 3 Introduction

NPEC Iran NPT Simulation

August 5, 2021

U.S. Resolution to the U.N.

The Security Council,

- *Noting* with concern that Iran has taken unjustified steps toward withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the “NPT”),
- *Reaffirming* the NPT as an “essential pillar” of international peace and security, and the “heart” of the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime, the international community has a vested stake in assuring that all state parties to the agreement remain in the treaty,
- *Noting* with serious concern, there are disturbing indications that Iran is preparing implosion devices capable of receiving weapons grade nuclear material,
- *Reaffirming* that halting such actions, including withdrawal from the NPT, is imperative to assure international peace and security,

U.S. Resolution to the U.N. (continued)...

- *Reaffirms* that if Iran were to complete its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this would constitute a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter,
- *Acting* under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
 1. *Decides* that Iran shall cease any work on implosion devices and suspend its NPT withdrawal,
 2. *Directs* the IAEA to conduct inspections for implosion devices,
 3. *Requires* that in a matter of days the IAEA is able to inspect any site that the IAEA deems necessary, and that the IAEA issue a statement on the status of Iran's nuclear program and the location and status of the implosion devices, enriched nuclear matter and centrifuges,
 4. *Decides* further that the Secretary General will inform the IAEA of a reasonable time to report back to the Security Council on a timely and regular basis, and the first report should be within one week,
 5. *Decides* further that should the IAEA not be permitted to inspect the sites it deems necessary, a U.N. Security Council meeting will be triggered,
 6. *Decides* that in the event that Iran does complete its withdrawal, the Council demands pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter that
 - i. Iran shall not receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly,
 - ii. Iran shall not manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
 - iii. Iran shall not seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
- *Encourages* all the member states to make all efforts to implement this resolution.
- *Resolves* to remain seized of this matter

President's Strategy

- Approach the IAEA to request special inspections, separate from the U.N.
 - Russians and Chinese don't have veto power in Vienna
 - Assume Iranians will allow inspections
 - Assume that inspectors will find something
 - Assume that U.S. can persuade Israelis to hold their fire
 - Assume U.S. can go back to U.N. to get a resolution once it has evidence
- If the international community is unable to reach agreement on making Iran open up to inspections, the U.S. will impose multinational economic sanctions until the Iranians agree to open up to inspections.
- Move U.S. and allied forces to the region with ability to enforce the sanctions.

President's Strategy (continued)

- The Secretary of Energy should brief Iran's timeline for making five weapons to the Israelis – the end of 2022 – sufficient time for the Israelis to give diplomacy more of a chance.
- The U.S. should make it very clear to Israel that if it chose to strike Iran, it would be doing so by itself and should not assume such a move would have U.S. support.
- U.S. should insist that Israel work through the IAEA and share any and all of its evidence with Vienna, as will the United States.
- In the unlikely event that Israel is attacked conventionally or by nuclear weapons, the U.S. of course will come to its defense.

Plenary 3: Takeaway Questions

- Do we understand Iran's motives and to the extent that we do, are any of them legitimate?
- What are the risks and benefits of ignoring the NPT in dealing with the Iranian case? What legal alternatives might there be to the NPT?
- Is there something the United States should be promoting in terms of threats or inducements to deter any country from threatening to withdraw from the NPT?
- Under what circumstances might Iran get nuclear weapons and the NPT still be useful to stop other countries from getting them?
- Should the United States be more concerned about Israel's defense than it is about the spread of nuclear weapons?