NPEC War and Diplomatic Simulations

It is January 2026. Although the Saudis have a ceasefire in place with the Houthis and the Saudi-Iranian détente continues, Saudi Arabia is still technically at war with the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Despite the U.S.-Houthi truce of May 2025, the Israelis continue to bomb Houthi territory using advanced U.S. munitions. These attacks become intolerable, and the Houthis start shooting at American ships, demanding Washington stop supplying U.S. stand-off munitions as a condition for reinstituting the truce.

Iran has fielded two Khayyam satellites, which provide multi-spectral imaging with one-meter resolution and near-continuous surveillance capability. In August 2022, Russia launched the first Khayyam satellite into orbit on behalf of Iran using a Soyuz rocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Russia, which is still conducting limited military operations in eastern Ukraine, shares use of Khayyam for acquiring targets and directing Russian drone warfare, as they did in 2022. Russia continues to provide technical experts to support Iran in maintaining satellite operations.

January 22, 2026: The Trump administration withdraws from nuclear deal negotiations with Iran and blames Tehran for the talk’s failure. Shortly after the talks collapse, Trump announces Washington, “will take all steps necessary measures to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program.” U.S. defense officials use WhatsApp to discuss potential military strikes on Iranian nuclear targets. Their chats leak to the press. Iranian intelligence analysts conclude that Israel and the United States are preparing for a missile strike on Iran’s civil-military nuclear facilities. Iran’s Supreme Leader promises to activate Iran’s proxies and retaliate against the United States, Israel, and any U.S. partner or ally (such as the Arab Gulf states) ifsuch an attack occurs.

In preparation, Iran transfers more cruise missiles, drones, and upgraded Fattah-1 ballistic missiles (equipped with maneuverable reentry vehicles and a precision of less than twenty meters)  to the Houthis, along with Iranian missile advisors. Western intelligence determines the Houthis have prepared a network of pre-surveyed launch zones and acquired new mobile missile systems, based on observed activity, signals intercepts, and limited satellite imagery. Meanwhile, a marginal ceasefire originally struck in 2022 between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis remains. The Houthis insists that the EU, United States, and Israel are not doing enough to create a Palestinian state and protect the citizens of Gaza. They resist, and put all commercial vessels in the Red Sea, including Saudi-flagged oil tankers, at risk. With American counterbattery strikes, the impact of the Houthi attacks subside, and shipping continues largely unimpeded. Frustrated by this failure and now equipped with new Iranian missiles, the Houthis shift tactics…

On January 25, the Houthis launch a precision strike using the Iranian-supplied Fattah-1 ballistic missiles against a Saudi-flagged oil tanker making its way to a Saudi port not in the Red Sea, but in the Persian Gulf. The missile flies over 1,200 kilometers, penetrating Saudi airspace. There are suspicions that several Saudi air defense ground stations also suffered cyber-attacks that delayed missile detection and targeting. The Houthis’ demonstration alarms Saudi Arabia and its neighbors who thought they had adequate air defenses.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) convenes his security cabinet and orders a set of limited but high-visibility airstrikes on northern Yemen. The Saudis target suspect Houthi missile launch zones, mobile radar units, and IRGC advisory teams. Among reported casualties is Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, head of the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee. The Houthis accuse Riyadh of killing innocent civilians. The Saudi government denies striking non-military targets. The fragile 2022 ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in Yemen breaks down.

Iranian state television condemns Saudi “aggression” against the Houthis and stages public mourning demonstrations for al-Houthi. These gatherings draw thousands. Iran vows it “will not back down in its defense of Yemeni resistance to Saudi perfidy and cowardice.” Tehran deploys additional advisors to assist Yemen in missile and electronic warfare operations.